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Abstract
Two philosophical applications of the concept of program-size com-
plexity are discussed. First, we consider the light program-size com-
plexity sheds on whether mathematics is invented or discovered, i.e.,
is empirical or is a priori. Second, we propose that the notion of al-
gorithmic independence sheds light on the question of being and how
the world of our experience can be partitioned into separate entities.
1. Introduction. Why is program size of philo-
sophical interest?
The cover of the January 2003 issue of La Recherche asks this dramatic
question:
Dieu est-il un ordinateur? [Is God a computer?]
The long cover story [1] is a reaction to Stephen Wolfram’s controversial book
A New Kind of Science [2]. The first half of the article points out Wolfram’s
predecessors, and the second half criticizes Wolfram.
The second half of the article begins (p. 38) with these words:
Il [Wolfram] n’avance aucune raison se´rieuse de penser que les
complexite´s de la nature puissent eˆtre ge´ne´re´es par des re`gles
e´nonc¸ables sous forme de programmes informatiques simples.
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The reason for thinking that a simple program might describe the world is,
basically, just Plato’s postulate that the universe is rationally comprehensible
(Timaeus). A sharper statement of this principle is in Leibniz’s Discours de
me´taphysique [3], section VI. Here is Leibniz’s original French (1686):
Mais Dieu a choisi celuy qui est le plus parfait, c’est a` dire celuy
qui est en meˆme temps le plus simple en hypotheses et le plus riche
en phenomenes, comme pourroit estre une ligne de Geometrie
dont la construction seroit aise´e et les propriete´s et effects seroient
fort admirables et d’une grande e´tendue.
For an English translation of this, see [4].
And Hermann Weyl [5] discovered that in Discours de me´taphysique Leib-
niz also states that a physical law has no explicative power if it is as compli-
cated as the body of data it was invented to explain.1
This is where algorithmic information theory (AIT) comes in. AIT posits
that a theory that explains X is a computer program for calculating X , that
therefore must be smaller, much smaller, than the size in bits of the data
X that it explains. AIT makes a decisive contribution to philosophy by
providing a mathematical theory of complexity. AIT defines the complexity
or algorithmic information content of X to be the size in bits H(X) of the
smallest computer program for calculating X . H(X) is also the complexity
of the most elegant (the simplest) theory for X .
In this article we discuss some other philosophical applications of AIT.
For those with absolutely no background in philosophy, let me recommend
two excellent introductions, Magee [6] and Brown [7]. For introductions to
AIT, see Chaitin [8, 9]. For another discussion of the philosophical implica-
tions of AIT, see Chaitin [10].
2. Is mathematics empirical or is it a priori?
2.1. Einstein: math is empirical
Einstein was a physicist and he believed that math is invented, not discov-
ered. His sharpest statement on this is his declaration that “the series of
1See the Leibniz quote in Section 2.3 below.
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integers is obviously an invention of the human mind, a self-created tool
which simplifies the ordering of certain sensory experiences.”
Here is more of the context:
In the evolution of philosophic thought through the centuries the
following question has played a major roˆle: What knowledge is
pure thought able to supply independently of sense perception?
Is there any such knowledge?. . . I am convinced that. . . the con-
cepts which arise in our thought and in our linguistic expressions
are all. . . the free creations of thought which can not inductively
be gained from sense-experiences. . . Thus, for example, the
series of integers is obviously an invention of the human
mind, a self-created tool which simplifies the ordering of
certain sensory experiences.2
The source is Einstein’s essay “Remarks on Bertrand Russell’s theory of
knowledge.” It was published in 1944 in the volume [11] on The Philosophy
of Bertrand Russell edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, and it was reprinted in
1954 in Einstein’s Ideas and Opinions [12].
And in his Autobiographical Notes [13] Einstein repeats the main point
of his Bertrand Russell essay, in a paragraph on Hume and Kant in which he
states that “all concepts, even those closest to experience, are from the point
of view of logic freely chosen posits.” Here is the bulk of this paragraph:
Hume saw clearly that certain concepts, as for example that of
causality, cannot be deduced from the material of experience by
logical methods. Kant, thoroughly convinced of the indispens-
ability of certain concepts, took them. . . to be the necessary
premises of any kind of thinking and distinguished them from
concepts of empirical origin. I am convinced, however, that this
distinction is erroneous or, at any rate, that it does not do justice
to the problem in a natural way. All concepts, even those
closest to experience, are from the point of view of logic
freely chosen posits. . .
2[The boldface emphasis in this and future quotations is mine, not the author’s.]
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2.2. Go¨del: math is a priori
On the other hand, Go¨del was a Platonist and believed that math is a pri-
ori. He makes his position blindingly clear in the introduction to an unpub-
lished lecture Go¨del *1961/?, “The modern development of the foundations
of mathematics in the light of philosophy,” Collected Works [14], vol. 3:3
I would like to attempt here to describe, in terms of philosophical
concepts, the development of foundational research in mathemat-
ics. . . , and to fit it into a general schema of possible philosophical
world-views [Weltanschauungen]. . . I believe that the most fruit-
ful principle for gaining an overall view of the possible world-views
will be to divide them up according to the degree and the manner
of their affinity to or, respectively, turning away from metaphysics
(or religion). In this way we immediately obtain a division into
two groups: skepticism, materialism and positivism stand on one
side, spiritualism, idealism and theology on the other. . . Thus
one would, for example, say that apriorism belongs in principle
on the right and empiricism on the left side. . . Now it is a familiar
fact, even a platitude, that the development of philosophy since
the Renaissance has by and large gone from right to left. . . It
would truly be a miracle if this (I would like to say rabid) devel-
opment had not also begun to make itself felt in the conception of
mathematics. Actually, mathematics, by its nature as an a
priori science, always has, in and of itself, an inclination toward
the right, and, for this reason, has long withstood the spirit
of the time [Zeitgeist] that has ruled since the Renaissance; i.e.,
the empiricist theory of mathematics, such as the one set forth
by Mill, did not find much support. . . Finally, however, around
the turn of the century, its hour struck: in particular, it was the
antinomies of set theory, contradictions that allegedly appeared
within mathematics, whose significance was exaggerated by skep-
tics and empiricists and which were employed as a pretext for the
leftward upheaval. . .
3The numbering scheme used in Go¨del’s Collected Works begins with an * for unpub-
lished papers, followed by the year of publication, or the first/last year that Go¨del worked
on an unpublished paper.
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Nevertheless, the Platonist Go¨del makes some remarkably strong state-
ments in favor of adding to mathematics axioms which are not self-evident
and which are only justified pragmatically. What arguments does he present
in support of these heretical views?
First let’s take a look at his discussion of whether Cantor’s continuum
hypothesis could be established using a new axiom [Go¨del 1947, “What is
Cantor’s continuum problem?”, Collected Works, vol. 2]:
. . . even disregarding the intrinsic necessity of some new
axiom, and even in case it has no intrinsic necessity at all, a
probable decision about its truth is possible also in an-
other way, namely, inductively by studying its “success.”
Success here means fruitfulness in consequences, in particular in
“verifiable” consequences, i.e., consequences demonstrable with-
out the new axiom, whose proofs with the help of the new ax-
iom, however, are considerably simpler and easier to discover, and
make it possible to contract into one proof many different proofs.
The axioms for the system of real numbers, rejected by intu-
itionists, have in this sense been verified to some extent, owing
to the fact that analytical number theory frequently allows one
to prove number-theoretical theorems which, in a more cumber-
some way, can subsequently be verified by elementary methods.
A much higher degree of verification than that, however, is con-
ceivable. There might exist axioms so abundant in their ver-
ifiable consequences, shedding so much light upon a whole field,
and yielding such powerful methods for solving problems (and
even solving them constructively, as far as that is possible) that,
no matter whether or not they are intrinsically necessary, they
would have to be accepted at least in the same sense as
any well-established physical theory.
Later in the same paper Go¨del restates this:
It was pointed out earlier. . . that, besides mathematical in-
tuition, there exists another (though only probable) crite-
rion of the truth of mathematical axioms, namely their
fruitfulness in mathematics and, one may add, possibly also in
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physics. . . The simplest case of an application of the criterion un-
der discussion arises when some. . . axiom has number-theoretical
consequences verifiable by computation up to any given integer.
And here is an excerpt from Go¨del’s contribution [Go¨del 1944, “Russell’s
mathematical logic,” Collected Works, vol. 2] to the same Bertrand Russell
festschrift volume [11] that was quoted above:
The analogy between mathematics and a natural science is en-
larged upon by Russell also in another respect. . . axioms need
not be evident in themselves, but rather their justifica-
tion lies (exactly as in physics) in the fact that they make
it possible for these “sense perceptions” to be deduced. . .
I think that. . . this view has been largely justified by subsequent
developments, and it is to be expected that it will be still more
so in the future. It has turned out that the solution of certain
arithmetical problems requires the use of assumptions essentially
transcending arithmetic. . . Furthermore it seems likely that for
deciding certain questions of abstract set theory and even for cer-
tain related questions of the theory of real numbers new axioms
based on some hitherto unknown idea will be necessary. Perhaps
also the apparently insurmountable difficulties which some other
mathematical problems have been presenting for many years are
due to the fact that the necessary axioms have not yet been found.
Of course, under these circumstances mathematics may lose a
good deal of its “absolute certainty;” but, under the influence of
the modern criticism of the foundations, this has already hap-
pened to a large extent. . .
Finally, take a look at this excerpt from Go¨del *1951, “Some basic theo-
rems on the foundations,” Collected Works, vol. 3, an unpublished essay by
Go¨del:
I wish to point out that one may conjecture the truth of a uni-
versal proposition (for example, that I shall be able to verify a
certain property for any integer given to me) and at the same
time conjecture that no general proof for this fact exists. It is
easy to imagine situations in which both these conjectures would
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be very well founded. For the first half of it, this would, for exam-
ple, be the case if the proposition in question were some equation
F (n) = G(n) of two number-theoretical functions which could be
verified up to very great numbers n.4 Moreover, exactly as in the
natural sciences, this inductio per enumerationem simplicem is by
no means the only inductive method conceivable in mathemat-
ics. I admit that every mathematician has an inborn abhorrence
to giving more than heuristic significance to such inductive argu-
ments. I think, however, that this is due to the very prejudice that
mathematical objects somehow have no real existence. If math-
ematics describes an objective world just like physics,
there is no reason why inductive methods should not be
applied in mathematics just the same as in physics. The
fact is that in mathematics we still have the same attitude today
that in former times one had toward all science, namely, we try to
derive everything by cogent proofs from the definitions (that is,
in ontological terminology, from the essences of things). Perhaps
this method, if it claims monopoly, is as wrong in mathematics
as it was in physics.
So Go¨del the Platonist has nevertheless managed to arrive, at least par-
tially, at what I would characterize, following Tymoczko [16], as a pseudo-
empirical or a quasi-empirical position!
2.3. AIT: math is quasi-empirical
What does algorithmic information theory have to contribute to this dis-
cussion? Well, I believe that AIT also supports a quasi-empirical view of
mathematics. And I believe that it provides further justification for Go¨del’s
belief that we should be willing to add new axioms.
Why do I say this?
As I have argued on many occasions, AIT, by measuring the complexity
(algorithmic information content) of axioms and showing that Go¨del incom-
pleteness is natural and ubiquitous, deepens the arguments that forced Go¨del,
4Such a verification of an equality (not an inequality) between two number-theoretical
functions of not too complicated or artificial structure would certainly give a great
probability to their complete equality, although its numerical value could not be estimated
in the present state of science. However, it is easy to give examples of general propositions
about integers where the probability can be estimated even now. . .
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in spite of himself, in spite of his deepest instincts about the nature of math-
ematics, to believe in inductive mathematics. And if one considers the use of
induction rather than deduction to establish mathematical facts, some kind
of notion of complexity must necessarily be involved. For as Leibniz stated in
1686, a theory is only convincing to the extent that it is substantially simpler
than the facts it attempts to explain:
. . . non seulement rien n’arrive dans le monde, qui soit absolument
irregulier, mais on ne sc¸auroit meˆmes rien feindre de tel. Car
supposons par exemple que quelcun fasse quantite´ de points sur le
papier a` tout hazard, comme font ceux qui exercent l’art ridicule
de la Geomance, je dis qu’il est possible de trouver une ligne
geometrique dont la motion soit constante et uniforme suivant
une certaine regle, en sorte que cette ligne passe par tous ces
points. . . Mais quand une regle est fort compose´e, ce qui
luy est conforme, passe pour irre´gulier. Ainsi on peut dire
que de quelque maniere que Dieu auroit cre´e´ le monde, il auroit
tousjours este´ regulier et dans un certain ordre general. Mais
Dieu a choisi celuy qui est le plus parfait, c’est a` dire celuy qui
est en meˆme temps le plus simple en hypotheses et le plus
riche en phenomenes. . . [Discours de me´taphysique, VI]
In fact Go¨del himself, in considering inductive rather than deductive
mathematical proofs, began to make some tentative initial attempts to for-
mulate and utilize notions of complexity. (I’ll tell you more about this in a
moment.) And it is here that AIT makes its decisive contribution to philos-
ophy, by providing a highly-developed and elegant mathematical theory of
complexity. How does AIT do this? It does this by considering the size of
the smallest computer program required to calculate a given object X , which
may also be considered to be the most elegant theory that explains X .
Where does Go¨del begin to think about complexity? He does so in two
footnotes in vol. 3 of his Collected Works. The first of these is a footnote
to Go¨del *1951. This footnote begins “Such a verification. . . ” and it was
reproduced, in part, in Section 2.2 above. And here is the relevant portion
of the second, the more interesting, of these two footnotes:
. . .Moreover, if every number-theoretical question of Goldbach
type. . . is decidable by a mathematical proof, there must exist an
8
infinite set of independent evident axioms, i.e., a set m of evident
axioms which are not derivable from any finite set of axioms (no
matter whether or not the latter axioms belong tom and whether
or not they are evident). Even if solutions are desired only for all
those problems of Goldbach type which are simple enough to be
formulated in a few pages, there must exist a great number of
evident axioms or evident axioms of great complication, in
contradistinction to the few simple axioms upon which
all of present day mathematics is built. (It can be proved
that, in order to solve all problems of Goldbach type of a certain
degree of complication k, one needs a system of axioms whose
degree of complication, up to a minor correction, is ≥ k.)5
This is taken from Go¨del *1953/9–III, one of the versions of his unfinished
paper “Is mathematics syntax of language?” that was intended for, but was
finally not included, in Schilpp’s Carnap festschrift in the same series as the
Bertrand Russell festschrift [11].
Unfortunately these tantalizing glimpses are, as far as I’m aware, all that
we know about Go¨del’s thoughts on complexity. Perhaps volumes 4 and
5, the two final volumes of Go¨del’s Collected Works, which contain Go¨del’s
correspondence with other mathematicians, and which will soon be available,
will shed further light on this.
Now let me turn to a completely different—but I believe equally
fundamental—application of AIT.
3. How can we partition the world into distinct
entities?
For many years I have asked myself, “What is a living being? How can we
define this mathematically?!” I still don’t know the answer! But at least
5[This is reminiscent of the theorem in AIT that pk = (the program of size ≤ k bits
that takes longest to halt) is the simplest possible “axiom” from which one can solve the
halting problem for all programs of size ≤ k. Furthermore, pk’s size and complexity both
differ from k by at most a fixed number of bits: |pk| = k +O(1) and H(pk) = k +O(1).
Actually, in order to solve the halting problem for all programs of size ≤ k, in addition
to pk one needs to know k − |pk|, which is how much pk’s size differs from k. This fixed
amount of additional information is required in order to be able to determine k from pk.]
9
I think I now know how to come to grips with the more general notion of
“entity” or “being.” In other words, how can we decompose our experience
into parts? How can we partition the world into its components? By what
right do we do this in spite of mystics who like Parmenides insist that the
world must be perceived as an organic unity (is a single substance) and
cannot be decomposed or analized into independent parts?
I believe that the key to answering this fundamental question lies in AIT’s
concept of algorithmic independence. What is algorithmic independence?
Two objects X and Y are said to be algorithmically independent if their
complexity is (approximately) additive. In other words, X and Y are algo-
rithmically independent if their information content decomposes additively,
i.e., if their joint information content (the information content of X and Y )
is approximately equal to the sum of their individual information contents:
H(X, Y ) ≈ H(X) +H(Y ).
More precisely, the left-hand side is the size in bits of the smallest program
that calculates the pair X , Y , and the right-hand side adds the size in bits
of the smallest program that produces X to the size in bits of the smallest
program that calculates Y .
Contrariwise, if X and Y are not at all independent, then it is much
better to compute them together than to compute them separately and
H(X) +H(Y ) will be much larger than H(X, Y ). The worst case is X = Y .
Then H(X) +H(Y ) is twice as large as H(X, Y ).
I feel that this notion of algorithmic independence is the key to decom-
posing the world into parts, parts the most interesting example of which are
living beings, particularly human beings. For what enables me to partition
the world in this way? The fact that thinking of the world as a sum of such
parts does not complicate my description of the world substantially and at
the same time enables me to use separate subroutines such as “my wife” and
“my cat” in thinking about the world. That is why such an analysis of the
world, such a decomposition, works.
Whereas on the contrary “my left foot” and “my right hand” are not
well thought of as independent components of the world but can best be
understood as parts of me. A description of my right hand and its activities
and history would not be substantially simpler than a description of me and
my entire life history, since my right hand is a part of me whose actions
express my intentions, and not its own independent desires.
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Of course, these observations are just the beginning. A great deal more
work is needed to develop this point of view. . .
For a technical discussion of algorithmic independence and the associated
notion of mutual algorithmic information defined as follows
H(X : Y ) ≡ H(X) +H(Y )−H(X, Y ),
see my book Chaitin [17].
4. Conclusion and future prospects
Let’s return to our starting point, to the cover of the January 2003 issue of
La Recherche. Is God a computer, as Wolfram and some others think, or is
God, as Plato and Pythagoras affirm, a mathematician?
And, an important part of this question, is the physical universe dis-
crete, the way computers prefer, not continuous, the way it seems to be
in classical Newtonian/Maxwellian physics? Speaking personally, I like the
discrete, not the continuous. And my theory, AIT, deals with discrete, digital
information, bits, not with continuous quantities. But the physical universe
is of course free to do as it likes!
Hopefully pure thought will not be called upon to resolve this. Indeed, I
believe that it is incapable of doing so; Nature will have to tell us. Perhaps
someday an experimentum crucis will provide a definitive answer. In fact,
for a hundred years quantum physics has been pointing insistently in the
direction of discreteness.6
References
[1] O. Postel-Vinay, “L’Univers est-il un calculateur?” [Is the universe a
calculator?], La Recherche, no. 360, January 2003, pp. 33–44.
[2] S. Wolfram, A New Kind of Science, Wolfram Media, 2002.
[3] Leibniz, Discours de me´taphysique, Gallimard, 1995.
6Discreteness in physics actually began even earlier, with atoms. And then, my col-
league John Smolin points out, when Boltzmann introduced coarse-graining in statistical
mechanics.
11
[4] G. W. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, Hackett, 1989.
[5] H. Weyl, The Open World, Yale University Press, 1932, Ox Bow Press,
1989.
[6] B. Magee, Confessions of a Philosopher, Modern Library, 1999.
[7] J. R. Brown, Philosophy of Mathematics, Routledge, 1999.
[8] G. J. Chaitin, “Paradoxes of randomness,” Complexity, vol. 7, no. 5,
pp. 14–21, 2002.
[9] G. J. Chaitin, “Meta-mathematics and the foundations of mathemat-
ics,” Bulletin EATCS, vol. 77, pp. 167–179, 2002.
[10] G. J. Chaitin, “On the intelligibility of the universe and the notions of
simplicity, complexity and irreducibility,”
http://arxiv.org/abs/math.HO/0210035, 2002.
[11] P. A. Schilpp, The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, Open Court, 1944.
[12] A. Einstein, Ideas and Opinions, Crown, 1954, Modern Library, 1994.
[13] A. Einstein, Autobiographical Notes, Open Court, 1979.
[14] K. Go¨del, Collected Works, vols. 1–5, Oxford University Press, 1986–
2003.
[15] Kurt Go¨del: Wahrheit & Beweisbarkeit [truth and provability], vols.
1–2, o¨bv & hpt, 2002.
[16] T. Tymoczko, New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics,
Princeton University Press, 1998.
[17] G. J. Chaitin, Exploring Randomness, Springer-Verlag, 2001.
Chaitin’s papers are also available at
http://cs.auckland.ac.nz/CDMTCS/chaitin.
12
